

# MPC185 Descriptor Programmer's Guide

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This application note is a supplement to the *MPC185 Security Co-Processor User's Manual* to assist programmers in understanding and creating descriptors. The information in this note includes more specific requirements than those that the MPC185 device driver covers. This application note is more useful to programmers who are familiar with the basics of MPC185 architecture in the user's manual.

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# 1 Data Packet Descriptor Overview

The MPC185 has bus mastering capability on the 60x bus that the PowerQUICC™ II and PowerPC™ processor families (built on Power Architecture™ technology) use to off-load data movement and encryption operations from a host processor. As the system controller, the host processor maintains a record of current secure sessions and the corresponding keys and contexts of those sessions. When the host has determined that security operation is required, the host can either directly write keys, context, and data to the MPC185 (MPC185 in target mode) or can create a 'data packet descriptor' to guide the MPC185 through the security operation, with the MPC185 acting as a bus master. The descriptor can be created in main memory, any memory local to the MPC185, including 32 Kbytes of on-chip gpRAM, or written directly to the data packet descriptor buffer in the MPC185 crypto-channel.

## 2 Descriptor Structure

The MPC185 data packet descriptors are conceptually similar to descriptors that most devices with DMA capability use. The descriptors are fixed-length (64 bytes), and consist of sixteen 32-bit fields. Descriptors begin with a header that describes the security operation to be performed and the mode to which the execution unit will be set while performing the operation.

Seven data length/data pointer pairs follow the header. Data length indicates the amount of contiguous data to be transferred. This amount cannot exceed 32 Kbytes. The data pointer refers to the address of the data that the MPC185 fetches. In this case, data is broadly interpreted to mean keys, context, additional pointers, or the actual plain text to be permuted.

Figure 1 shows an example of a data packet descriptor.

0	31
Descriptor Header	
R/W	
Pointer 1	
Length 2	
Pointer 2	
Length 3	
Pointer 3	
Length 4	
Pointer 4	
Length 5	
Pointer 5	
Length 6	
Pointer 6	
Length 7	
Pointer 7	
Next Descriptor Pointer	

**Figure 1. Example Data Packet Descriptor**

### 3 Descriptor Header

The host creates descriptors to guide the MPC185 through required cryptographic operations. The descriptor header defines the operations to be performed, the mode for each operation, and ordering of the inputs and outputs in the body of the descriptor. The MPC185 device drivers allow the host to create proper headers for each cryptographic operation. [Figure 2](#) shows the descriptor header.

	0	11	12	23	24	27	28	29	30	31
Field	Op_0		Op_1		Desc_TYPE		RSVD	ST	DN	
Reset	0x0000_0000									
R/W	R/W									
Addr	Channel_1 0x02080, Channel_2 0x03080, Channel_3 0x04080, Channel_4 0x05080									

**Figure 2. Descriptor Header**

[Table 1](#) defines the header bits.


**Table 1. Header Bit Definitions**

Bits	Name	Description
0:11	Op_0	Op_0 contains two sub fields, EU_Select and Mode_Data. <a href="#">Figure 3</a> shows the sub field detail. EU_SELECT[0:3] - Programs the channel to select a primary EU of a given type. <a href="#">Table 2</a> lists the possible EU_SELECT values. MODE_DATA[4:11] - Programs the primary EU mode data. The mode data is specific to the chosen EU. This data is passed directly to bits 0:7 of the specified EU mode register.
12:23	Op_1	Op_1 contains two sub fields, EU_Select and Mode_Data. <a href="#">Figure 3</a> shows the sub field detail. EU_SELECT[12:15] — Programs the channel to select a secondary EU of a given type. <a href="#">Table 2</a> lists the possible EU_SELECT values. MODE_DATA[16:23] —Programs the secondary EU mode data. The mode data is specific to the chosen EU. This data is passed directly to bits 0:7 of the specified EU mode register. <b>Note:</b> The MDEU is the only valid secondary EU. Values for Op1 EU_SELECT other than 'MDEU' or 'No secondary CHA selected' causes an 'Unrecognized Header' error condition. Selecting MDEU for both primary and secondary EU also creates an error condition.
24:27	Desc_Type	Descriptor Type—Each type of descriptor determines the following attributes for the corresponding data length/pointer pairs: the direction of the data flow; which EU is associated with the data; and which internal EU address is used. <a href="#">Table 10</a> lists the valid types of descriptors.
28:29	—	Reserved—set to zero
30	ST	Snoop type — Selects which of the two types of available snoop modes applies to the descriptor. See <a href="#">Figure 12</a> for a graphical representation of the snooping concept.  0 Snoop output data mode. 1 Snoop input data mode. In 'Snoop input data mode', while the bus transaction to write data into the input FIFO of the primary EU is in progress, the secondary EU (always MDEU) snoops the same data into its input FIFO. In 'Snoop output data mode', the secondary EU (always MDEU) snoops data into its input FIFO during the bus transaction to read data out of the output FIFO of the primary EU.

**Table 1. Header Bit Definitions (continued)**

Bits	Name	Description
31	DN	<p>DONE_NOTIFICATION_FLAG — Done Notification Flag.</p> <p>Setting this bit indicates whether to perform notification upon completion of this descriptor. The notification can take the form of an interrupt or modified header write back or both depending upon the state of the INTERRUPT_ENABLE and WRITEBACK_ENABLE control bits in Crypto Channel Configuration Register.</p> <p>0 Do not signal DONE upon completion of this descriptor (unless globally programmed to do so by means of the Crypto Channel Configuration Register.)</p> <p>1 Signal DONE upon completion of this descriptor.</p> <p><b>Note:</b> The MPC185 can be programmed to perform DONE notification upon completion of each descriptor, upon completion of any descriptor, or completion of the final descriptor in a chain. This bit provides for the second case.</p> <p>When the Crypto-Channel is requesting a write of the Descriptor Header back to system memory, the most significant byte (Big Endian) of the header always reads as set to 0xFF, and the remaining 24 bits will not be changed.</p>

Figure 3 shows the two sub fields of Op\_x.



**Figure 3. Op\_x Sub Field**

Op0 EU\_SELECT values of ‘no primary EU selected’ or ‘reserved EU’ cause an ‘unrecognized header error’ condition during processing of the descriptor header. Also, the primary EU selected by the Op0 EU\_SELECT field may be only DEU, AESU, or AFEU when a valid secondary EU is selected. For this case, all other values of Op0 EU\_SELECT cause an ‘unrecognized header’ error condition.

The full range of permissible EU\_Select values is shown in Table 2.

**Table 2. EU\_Select Values**

Value	EU Select
0000	No EU selected
0001	AFEU
0010	DEU
0011	MDEU
0100	RNG
0101	PKEU
0110	AESU
0111	KEU
Others	Reserved EU

## 4 Execution Unit Mode Data

The MPC185 execution units are programmed by means of the descriptor header. The Mode\_Data portion of Op\_X field in the descriptor header is written to bits 0:7 of the mode register in the execution unit selected by the EU\_Select field in Op\_X. A complete explanation of the execution unit registers can be found in Chapter 5 of the *MPC185 Security Co-Processor User's Manual*. However, the mode register for each EU is provided in this section for convenience.

### 4.1 PKEU Mode Register

This register specifies the internal PKEU routine to be executed. For the root arithmetic routines, PKEU has the capability to perform arithmetic operations on subsegments of the entire memory, which is especially useful for operations such as elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement computation. Using regAsel and regBsel, for example, parameter memory A subsegment 2 can be multiplied into parameter memory B subsegment 1. [Figure 4](#) and [Figure 5](#) detail two definitions.

	0	1		7	8		31
Field	—	MODE				Reserved	
Reset	0				0		
R/W	R/W						
Addr	PKEU 0x10000						
	0						31
Field	Reserved						
Reset	0						
R/W	R/W						
Addr	PKEU 0x10004						

**Figure 4. PKEU Mode Register: Definition 1**

	0	1	3	4	7	8		31
Field	—	MODE	RegSEL		Reserved			
Reset	0	0	0		0			
R/W	R/W							
Addr	PKEU 0x10000							
	0							31
Field	Reserved							
Reset	0							
R/W	R/W							
Addr	PKEU 0x10004							

**Figure 5. PKEU Mode Register: Definition 2**

Table 3 lists mode register routine definitions. Parameter memories are referred to for the base address, as shown.

**Table 3. Mode Register Routine Definitions**

Routine	Mode [1:3]	Mode [4:5]	Mode [6:7]
Reserved	000	00	00
Clear memory	000	0	01
Modular exponentiation	000	00	10
$R^2 \text{ mod } N$	000	00	11
$R_n R_p \text{ mod } N$	000	01	00
$F_p$ affine point multiplication	000	01	01
$F_{2m}$ affine point multiplication	000	01	10
$F_p$ projective point multiplication	000	01	11
$F_{2m}$ projective point multiplication	000	10	00
$F_p$ point addition	000	10	01
$F_p$ point doubling	000	10	10
$F_{2m}$ point addition	000	10	11
$F_{2m}$ point doubling	000	11	00
$F_{2m} R^2 \text{ CMD}$	000	11	01
$F_{2m} \text{ INV CMD}$	000	11	10
MOD INV CMD	000	11	11
Modular addition	001	regAsel <sup>1</sup> 00 = A0 01 = A1 10 = A2 11 = A3	regBsel <sup>1</sup> 00 = B0 01 = B1 10 = B2 11 = B3
Modular subtraction	010		
Modular multiplication with single reduction	011		
Modular multiplication with double reduction	100		
Polynomial addition	101		
Polynomial multiplication with single reduction	110		
Polynomial multiplication with double reduction	111		

<sup>1</sup> regAsel and regBsel here refer to the specific segment of parameter memory A and B.

## 4.2 DEU Mode Register

The DEU mode register contains three bits to program the DEU, as shown in Figure 6. It also reflects the value of burst size, which the crypto-channel loads during normal operation with the MPC185 as an initiator. Burst size is not relevant to target mode operations, where an external host pushes and pulls data from the execution units.

The mode register is cleared when the DEU is reset or re-initialized. Setting a reserved mode bit generates a data error. If the mode register is modified during processing, a context error is generated.

	0	4	5	6	7	8	12	13	15	16	31	
Field	Reserved			CE	Ts	ED	Reserved		Burst Size	Reserved		
Reset	0			0	0	0	0		0	0		
R/W	R/W											
Addr	DEU 0x0A000											
	0											31
Field	Reserved											
Reset	0											
R/W	R/W											
Addr	DEU 0x0A004											

**Figure 6. DEU Mode Register**

Table 4 describes the DEU mode register signals.

**Table 4. DEU Mode Register Signals**

Bits	Signal	Description
0-4	—	Reserved
5	CBC/ECB	If set, DEU operates in cipher-block-chaining mode. If not set, DEU operates in electronic code book mode. 0 ECB mode 1 CBC mode
6	Triple/Single DES	If set, DEU operates the Triple DES algorithm; if not set, DEU operates the single DES algorithm. 0 single DES 1 triple DES
7	encrypt/decrypt	If set, DEU operates the encryption algorithm; if not set, DEU operates the decryption algorithm. 0 Perform decryption 1 Perform encryption
8-12	—	Reserved
13-15	Burst Size	The MPC185 implements flow control to allow larger than FIFO sized blocks of data to be processed with a single key/IV. The DEU signals to the crypto-channel that a “burst size” amount of data is available to be pushed to or pulled from the FIFO.  <b>Note:</b> Including this field in the DEU Mode Register avoids confusing a user who may read this register in debug mode. Burst size should not be written directly to the DEU.
16-31	—	Reserved

### 4.3 AFEU Mode Register

The AFEU mode register contains 3 bits to program the AFEU, as shown in Figure 7. It also reflects the value of burst size, which the crypto-channel loads during normal operation with the MPC185 as an initiator. Burst size is not relevant to target mode operations, where an external host pushes and pulls data from the execution units.

The mode register is cleared when the AFEU is reset or re-initialized. Setting a reserved mode bit generates a data error. If the mode register is modified during processing, a context error is generated.

### 4.3.1 Host-Provided Context Using Prevent Permute

In the default mode of operation, the host provides the key and key size to the AFEU. The initial memory values in the S-box are permuted with the key to create new S-box values to encrypt the plaintext.

If the ‘prevent permute’ mode bit is set, the AFEU does not require a key. Rather, the host writes the context to the AFEU and message processing occurs using the provided context. This mode is used to resume processing of a message using the already permuted S-box. The context may be written through the FIFO if the ‘context source’ mode bit is set.

### 4.3.2 Dump Context

This mode may be independently specified in addition to host-provided context mode. In this mode, when message processing is complete and the output data is read, the AFEU makes the current context data available for reads by means of the output FIFO.

**NOTE**

After the initial key permute to generate a context for an AFEU-encrypted session, all subsequent messages re-use that context, such that it is loaded, modified during the encryption, and unloaded, similar to the use of a CBC initialization vector in DES operations. A new context is generated (by means of key permute) according to a rekeying interval that the security protocol specifies. Context should never be loaded to encrypt a message if a key is loaded and permuted at the same time.

	0	4	5	6	7	8	12	13	15	16	31	
Field	Reserved			cs	dc	pp	Reserved		Burst Size	Reserved		
Reset	0			0	0	0	0		0	0		
R/W	R/W											
Addr	AFEU 0x08000											
	0											31
Field	Reserved											
Reset	0											
R/W	R/W											
Addr	AFEU 0x08004											

**Figure 7. AFEU Mode Register**



Table 5 describes the AFEU mode register signals.

**Table 5. AFEU Mode Register Signals**

Bits	Signal	Description
0-4	—	Reserved
5	Context Source	If Set, the context is moved from the input FIFO into the S-box before starting encryption/decryption. Otherwise, context should be directly written to the context registers. Context Source is checked only if the prevent permute bit is set. 0 Context not from FIFO 1 Context from input FIFO
6	Dump Context	If Set, this causes the context to be moved from the S-box to the output FIFO following assertion AFEU's done interrupt. 0 Do not dump context. 1 After cipher, dump context.
7	Prevent Permute	Normally, AFEU receives a key and uses that information to randomize the S-box. If reusing a context from a previous descriptor or if in static assignment mode, this bit should be set to prevent AFEU from re performing this permutation step. 0 Perform S-Box permutation. 1 Do not permute.
8-12	—	Reserved
13-15	Burst Size	The MPC185 implements flow control to allow larger than FIFO sized blocks of data to be processed with a single key/context. The AFEU signals to the crypto-channel that a “burst size” amount of data is available to be pushed to or pulled from the FIFO.  Note: Including this field in the AFEU Mode Register avoids confusing a user who may read this register in debug mode. Burst size should not be written directly to the AFEU.
16-31	—	Reserved

## 4.4 MDEU Mode Register

The MDEU mode register, shown in [Figure 8](#), contains 8 bits to program the MDEU. It also reflects the value of burst size, which the crypto-channel loads during normal operation with the MPC185 as an initiator. Burst size is not relevant to target mode operations, where an external host pushes and pulls data from the execution units.

The mode register is cleared when the MDEU is reset or re-initialized. Setting a reserved mode bit generates a data error. If the mode register is modified during processing, a context error is generated.

Figure 8 shows the MDEU mode register.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	12	13	15	16	31
Field	Cont	--	INT	HMAC	PD	ALG	—			BURST SIZE			—	
Reset	0													
R/W	R/W													
Addr	MDEU 0x0C000													
	0													31
Field	Reserved													
Reset	0													
R/W	R/W													
Addr	MDEU 0x0C004													

**Figure 8. MDEU Mode Register**

Table 6 describes the MDEU mode register signals.

**Table 6. MDEU Mode Register**

Bits	Signal	Description
0	Cont	Continue (Cont): Used during HMAC/HASH processing when the data to be hashed is spread across multiple descriptors. 0 = Don't Continue- operate the MDEU in auto completion mode. 1 = Preserve context to operate the MDEU in Continuation mode.
1–2	—	Reserved
3	INT	Initialization Bit (INT): Causes an algorithm-specific initialization of the digest registers. Most operations require this bit to be set. Only static operations that are continuing from a know intermediate hash value would not initialize the registers. 0 Do not initialize. 1 Initialize the selected algorithm's starting registers.
4	HMAC	Identifies the hash operation to execute: 0 Perform standard hash 1 Perform HMAC operation. Requires a key and key length information.
5	PD	If set, configures the MDEU to automatically pad partial message blocks. 0 Do not autopad. 1 Perform automatic message padding whenever an incomplete message block is detected.
6–7	ALG	Message Digest algorithm selection 00 = SHA-160 algorithm (full name for SHA-1) 01 = SHA-256 algorithm 10 = MD5 algorithm 11 = Reserved
8–12	—	Reserved

**Table 6. MDEU Mode Register (continued)**

Bits	Signal	Description
13–15	BURST SIZE	The implements flow control to allow larger than FIFO-sized blocks of data to be processed with a single key/context. The MDEU signals to the crypto-channel that a “burst size” amount of data is available to be pushed to the FIFO. <b>Note:</b> Including this field in the MDEU Mode Register avoids confusing a user who may read this register in debug mode. Burst size should not be written directly to the MDEU.
16–31	—	Reserved

#### 4.4.1 Recommended Settings for MDEU Mode Register

The most common task likely to be executed by means of the MDEU is HMAC generation. HMACs provide message integrity within a number of security protocols, including IPsec and SSL/TLS. When a single dynamic descriptor (the MDEU acting as sole or secondary EU) generates the HMAC, use the following mode register bit settings:

Continue—Off  
 Initialize—On  
 HMAC—On  
 Autopad—On

When the HMAC is generated for a message that is spread across a chain of static descriptors, use the following mode register bit settings:

- First Descriptor:
  - Continue—On
  - Initialize—On
  - HMAC—On
  - Autopad—Off
- Middle Descriptor(s):
  - Continue—On
  - Initialize—Off
  - HMAC—Off
  - Autopad—Off
- Final Descriptor
  - Continue—Off
  - Initialize—Off
  - HMAC—On
  - Autopad—On

See Chapter 5 of the *MPC185 Security Co-Processor User’s Manual60x* for additional information about descriptors.

## 4.5 RNG Mode Register

The RNG mode register can control the RNG. Randomizing, which is one operational mode, is defined. Writing any other value than 0 through 0:7 causes a data error interrupt that is reflected in the RNG interrupt status register. The mode register also reflects the value of burst size, which the crypto-channel loads during normal operation with the MPC185 as an initiator. Burst size is not relevant to target mode operations, where an external host pushes and pulls data from the execution units.

The mode register is cleared when the RNG is reset or re-initialized. The RNG mode register is shown in [Figure 9](#).

	0	12	13	15	16	31
Field	Reserved			Burst Count		Reserved
Reset	0					
R/W	R/W					
Addr	0x0E000					
	0					31
Field	Reserved					
Reset	0					
R/W	R/W					
Addr	0x0E004					

**Figure 9. RNG Mode Register**

[Table 7](#) describes the RNG mode register signals.

**Table 7. RNG Mode Register Definitions**

Bits	Signal	Description
0:12	—	Reserved, must be set to zero
13:15	Burst Count	The MPC185 implements flow control to allow larger than FIFO-sized blocks of data to be processed with a single key/context. The RNG signals to the crypto-channel that a “burst size” amount of data is available to be pulled from the FIFO.  <b>Note:</b> Including this field in the RNG Mode Register avoids confusing a user who may read this register in debug mode. Burst size should not be written directly to the RNG.
16:31	—	Reserved

## 4.6 AESU Mode Register

The AESU mode register contains 4 bits to program the AESU. It also reflects the value of burst size, which the crypto-channel loads during normal operation with the MPC185 as an initiator. Burst size is not relevant to target mode operations, where an external host pushes and pulls data from the execution units.

The mode register is cleared when the AESU is reset or re-initialized. Setting a reserved mode bit generates a data error. If the mode register is modified during processing, a context error is generated. The AESU mode register is shown in [Figure 10](#).

	0	3	4	5	6	7	8	12	13	15	16	63
Field	Reserved			RDK	CM		ED	Reserved		Burst Size		Reserved
Reset	0											
R/W	R/W											
Addr	AESU 0x12000											
	0											31
Field	Reserved											
Reset	0											
R/W	R/W											
Addr	AESU 0x12004											

**Figure 10. AESU Mode Register**

Table 8 describes the AESU mode register signals.

**Table 8. AESU Mode Register Signals**

Bits	Signal	Description
0-3	—	Reserved
4	RDK	Restore Decrypt Key (RDK): Specifies that key data write will contain pre-expanded key (decrypt mode only). 0 Expand the user key before decrypting the first block. 1 Do not expand the key. The expanded decryption key will be written following the context switch.
5-6	CM	Cipher Mode: Controls which cipher mode the AESU uses in processing: 00 ECB -Electronic Codebook mode. 01 CBC- Cipher Block Chaining mode 10 Reserved 11 CTR- Counter Mode
7	Encrypt/Decrypt	If set, AESU operates the encryption algorithm; if not set, AESU operates the decryption algorithm. Note: This bit is ignored if CM is set to “11” - CTR Mode. 0 Perform decryption. 1 Perform encryption.
8-12	—	Reserved
13-15	Burst Size	The MPC185 implements flow control to allow larger than FIFO-sized blocks of data to be processed with a single key/context. The AESU signals to the crypto-channel that a “burst size” amount of data is available to be pushed to or pulled from the FIFO. <b>Note:</b> Including this field in the AESU mode register avoids confusing a user who may read this register in debug mode. Burst size should not be written directly to the AESU.
16:31	—	Reserved

### 4.6.1 Restore Decrypt Key

In most networking applications, the decryption of an AES protected packet is performed as a single operation. However, if the decryption of a message must be split across multiple descriptors, the AESU

allows the user to save the decrypt key and the active AES context to memory for later re-use. This option saves the internal AESU processing overhead associated with regenerating the decryption key schedule (approximately 12 AESU clock cycles for the first block of data to be decrypted).

The use of RDK is completely optional. The input time of the preserved decrypt key may exceed the approximate 12 cycles required to restore the decrypt key for processing the first block.

Freescale recommends the following procedure for using RDK:

- The descriptor type used in decryption of the first portion of the message is '0100—AESU Key Expand Output'. The description mode must be 'Decrypt'. See Chapter 4 in the *MPC185 Security Co-Processor User's Manual, 8xx Interface*, for more information. The descriptor causes the MPC185 to write the contents of the context and key registers (which contains the expanded decrypt key) to memory.
- To process the remainder of the message, use a 'normal' descriptor type (descriptor type selection based on the need for simultaneous HMAC generation, and so on), and set the 'restore decrypt key' mode bit. Load the context registers and the expanded decrypt key with previously saved key and context data from the first message. The key size is written as before (16, 24, or 32 bytes).

## 4.7 KEU Mode Register

The mode register, which is shown in [Figure 11](#), contains 5 bits to program the KEU. It also reflects the value of burst size, which the crypto-channel loads during normal operation with the MPC185 as an initiator. Burst size is not relevant to target mode operations, where an external host pushes and pulls data from the execution units.

The mode register is cleared when the KEU is reset or re-initialized. Setting a reserved mode bit generates a data error. If the mode register is modified during processing, a context error is generated.

	0	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	12	13	15	16	63
Field	Reserved		PE	INT	CD	Alg		Reserved			Burst Size	Reserved	
Reset	0												
R/W	R/W												
Addr	KEU 0x14000												

**Figure 11. KEU Mode Register**

[Table 9](#) describes KEU mode register signals.

**Table 9. KEU Mode Register Signals**

Bits	Signal	Description
0-2	—	Reserved
3	PE	Process End of Message (PE). Enables final processing of last message block (F9 only). 0 = Prevent final block processing (message incomplete). 1 = Enable final block processing (message complete). <b>Note:</b> For f9 operations, if the 3G frame (or “message”) is being processed as a whole (not split across multiple descriptors), the process end of message bit should be set. If the frame is processed across multiple descriptors, this bit should only be set on the descriptor performing f9 processing on the final message block.
4	INT	Initialization (INT). Enables initialization for a new message. 0 = Prevent Initialization. 1 = Enable Initialization. <b>Note:</b> For f8 or f9 operations, if the 3G frame (or “message”) is being processed as a whole (not split across multiple descriptors), the Initialization bit should be set. If the frame is processed across multiple descriptors, this bit should only be set on the descriptor processing on the first message block.
5	CD	Communication Direction (CD). Determines the direction that the specified algorithm will be used. 0 = Uplink (Decrypt) 1 = Downlink (Encrypt) <b>Note:</b> Communication Direction is independent from encrypt/decrypt, however from the perspective of a radio node controller, frames arriving from a mobile station will have the Uplink Bit set, and should be decrypted, and frames needing to be sent on a downlink channel to a mobile station should be encrypted.
6-7	ALG	F8/F9 Bits (ALG). Specifies functions to perform. 00 = Perform F8 function. 01 = Reserved 10 = Perform F9 function. 11 = Reserved
8-12	—	Reserved
13-15	Burst Size	The MPC185 implements flow control to allow larger than FIFO-sized blocks of data to be processed with a single key/context. The RNG signals to the crypto-channel that a ‘burst size’ amount of data is available to be pulled from the FIFO. <b>Note:</b> Including this field in the KEU Mode Register avoids confusing a user who may read this register in debug mode. Burst size should not be written directly to the KEU.
16-63	—	Reserved

## 5 Descriptor Type Field

The MPC185 accepts 13 fixed format descriptors. The descriptor type field in the descriptor header informs the crypto-channel of the ordering of the inputs and outputs that the length/pointer pairs define in the descriptor body. The MPC190 (a previous Freescale security co-processor with mastering capability) allowed definition (within limits) of the order in which the MPC190 fetched keys, context, and data before processing. The MPC185 descriptor type field advises the crypto-channel of the predetermined ordering of keys, context, and null fields. The ordering of inputs and outputs in the length/pointer pairs (as defined by descriptor type) is shown in [Table 11](#).

[Table 10](#) shows the permissible values for the descriptor type field in the descriptor header. Note that not all descriptor types are operationally useful. Some exist for test and debug reasons and provide flexibility

in dealing with evolving security standards. The cryptographic transforms that most security protocols require use types 0001 and 0010.

**Table 10. Descriptor Types**

Value	Descriptor Type	Notes
0000	Reserved	—
0001	common_nonsnoop_no_afeu	Common, nonsnooping, non-PKEU, non-AFEU
0010	hmac_snoop_no_afeu	Snooping, HMAC, non-AFEU
0011	non_hmac_snoop_no_afeu	Snooping, non-HMAC, non-AFEU
0100	aseu_key_expand_output	Non-snooping, non HMAC, AESU, expanded key out
0101	common_nonsnoop_afeu	Common, nonsnooping, AFEU
0110	hmac_snoop_afeu	Snooping, HMAC, AFEU (no context out)
0111	non_hmac_snoop_afeu	Snooping, non-HMAC, AFEU
1000	pkeu_mm	PKEU-MM
1001	pkeu_ec	PKEU-EC
1010	pkeu_static_ec_point	PKEU static-EC point (completes operand loading and executes)
1011	pkeu_static_ec_parameter	PKEU static-EC parameter (preloads EC operands)
1100	Reserved	—
1101	Reserved	—
1110	hmac_snoop_afeu_key_in	AFEU context out available
1111	hmac_snoop_afeu_ctx_in	AFEU context out available

Table 11 shows how to use length/pointer pairs with the various descriptor types to load keys, context, and data into the execution units, and how the required outputs should be unloaded. Note that some outputs are optional.

**Table 11. Descriptor Length/Pointer Mapping**

Descriptor Type	L/P 1	L/P 2	L/P 3	L/P 4	L/P 5	L/P 6	L/P 7
0000	Null	Null	Null	Null	Null	Null	Null
0001	Null	IV	Key	Data in	Data out	IV out	MAC out
0010	HMAC key	HMAC data	Key	IV	Data in	Data out	HMAC/context out
0011	MD Ctx in	IV	Key	Data in	Data out	IV out	MD/context out
0100	Null	IV	Key	Data in	Data out	IV out	Key out by means of FIFO
0101	Null	IV in by means of FIFO	Key	Data in	Data out	IV out by means of FIFO	MD/context out



**Table 11. Descriptor Length/Pointer Mapping (continued)**

Descriptor Type	L/P 1	L/P 2	L/P 3	L/P 4	L/P 5	L/P 6	L/P 7
0110	HMAC key	HMAC data	Key	IV in by means of FIFO	Data in	Data out	HMAC/context out
0111	MD Ctx in	IV in by means of FIFO	Key	Data in	Data out	IV out by means of FIFO	MD/context out
1000	B	A	E	N	B out	Null	Null
1001	B	A	Key	N	B1 out	Null	Null
1010	A0	A1	A2	B1 out	B2 out	B3 out	Null
1011	A3	B0	B1	Key	N	Null	Null
1100	Null	Null	Null	Null	Null	Null	Null
1101	Null	Null	Null	Null	Null	Null	Null
1110	HMAC key	HMAC data	Key	Data in	Data out	IV out by means of FIFO	HMAC/context out
1111	HMAC key	HMAC data	IV	Data in	Data out	IV out by means of FIFO	HMAC/context out

## 5.1 Descriptor Type 0001

Descriptor type 0001 is used for a wide variety of functions, most of which do not require using all the length/pointer fields. A few non-obvious uses of this descriptor type are highlighted in [Table 12](#).

**Table 12. Descriptor Type 0001 Length/Pointer Mapping**

Descriptor Type	L/P 1	L/P 2	L/P 3	L/P 4	L/P 5	L/P 6	L/P 7	Use
0001	Null	Null	Null	Null	Data out	Null	Null	RNG only
0001	Null	Ctx-in (opt)	Null	Data in	Null	Hash out	Null	Hash only
0001	Null	Ctx-In	Integrity Key	Data In	Null	MAC out	Null	Kasumi F9
0001	Null	Ctx-in (opt)	HMAC Key	Data in	Null	HMAC out	Null	HMAC only
0001	Null	IV	Key	Data in	Data out	IV out	MAC out	Self-integrity checking operations

For RNG operations, no key, context, or data can be sent in to the MPC185. The only relevant pointer is the one that causes random data to be written from the RNG output FIFO to memory.

For HMAC only operations, the HMAC key should be loaded, followed by the data. The HMAC itself is written out by means of L/P 6. If an HMAC calculation is spread across multiple descriptors, all descriptors after the first must load the MDEU context registers by means of L/P 2, which requires the first descriptor to output the MDEU context or message digest, rather than an HMAC, with L/P 6.

Certain protocols do not rely on the HMAC function provided by the MDEU to generate MACs, or message integrity check values. An example is the Kasumi f9 operation that the KEU performs. When directed by the KEU mode bits in the Op\_0 portion of the descriptor header, the KEU generates the f9 MAC. The MAC that the f9 function generates is written out by means of L/P 6.

## 5.2 Snoop Type Bit

As Table 1 shows, bit 1 controls the type of ‘snooping’ that must occur between the primary and secondary EU. The rationale for ‘in-snooping’ versus ‘out-snooping’ is found in security protocols that perform both encryption and integrity checking, such as IPsec. When transmitting an IPsec ESP packet, the encapsulator must encrypt the packet payload and calculate an HMAC over the header plus encrypted payload. Because the MDEU cannot generate the HMAC without the output of the primary EU (the one performing encryption, typically the DEU or AESU), the MDEU must ‘out-snoop.’

When receiving an IPsec packet, the decapsulator must calculate the HMAC over the encrypted portion of the packet before decryption to allow the MDEU to source its data from the input FIFO of the primary EU without waiting for the primary EU to finish its task.

Note that slightly different portions of an IPsec packet would pass through the primary and secondary EUs, in both the in-snooping and out-snooping cases. Providing different starting pointers and byte lengths to the channel in the body of the descriptor deals with these offsets.

An overview of the snooping concept is shown in Figure 12.




Figure 12. Snooping

## 5.3 Done Notification Bit

The done notification bit in the MPC185 descriptor header is a manual override to the crypto-channel configuration register’s NOTIFICATION\_TYPE bit, which determines whether the MPC185 advises the system (by means of interrupt or header writeback) that it is DONE with an operation after every descriptor or after a chain of descriptors. Setting the notification bit in the descriptor header is unnecessary and

redundant if NOTIFICATION\_TYPE is set to ‘end-of-descriptor’; but if set to ‘end-of-chain,’ the notification bit in the header can be quite useful as an intermediate notification.

The DONE notification can be an interrupt or modified header writeback or both, depending on the state of the INTERRUPT\_ENABLE and WRITEBACK\_ENABLE control bits in the crypto-channel configuration register.

When the channel signals DONE by means of header writeback, the most significant byte of the original header (at its original location in system memory) always reads as set to 0xFF, and the remaining 24 bits are not modified. MPC185-initiated 60x bus writes can occur only on 64-bit word boundaries, but reads can occur on any byte boundary. Writing back a header read from a non-64-bit word boundary yields unpredictable results.

## 6 Descriptor Length and Pointer Fields

The length and pointer fields represent one of 7 data length/pointer pairs. Each pair defines a block of data in system memory. The length field gives the length of the block in bytes. The maximum allowable number of bytes is 32 Kbytes. A value of 0 loaded into the length field indicates that this length/pointer pair should be skipped and processing should continue with the next pair.

The pointer field contains the address, in 60x address space, of the first byte of the data block. Transfers from the 60x bus with the pointer address set to 0 have the length value written to the EU, and no data is fetched from the 60x bus.

**NOTE**

Certain public key operations require information about data length, but not the data itself. [Figure 13](#) shows the descriptor length field.

	0	15	16	31
Field	Reserved		Data Length Field	
	0		msb<-----lsb	
Reset	0			
R/W	R/W			


**Figure 13. Descriptor Length Field**

[Table 13](#) shows the descriptor length field mapping.

**Table 13. Descriptor Length Field Mapping**

Bits	Name	Reset Value	Description
0:15	—	0	Reserved, set to zero
16:31	Data Field Length	0	The maximum length of this field is 32K bytes. Under host control, a channel can be temporarily locked static, and data only” descriptors can be chained to fetch blocks larger than 32K bytes in 32K byte sub-blocks without key/context switching, until the large original block has been completely ciphered. Length fields also indicate the size of items to be written back to memory upon completion of security processing in the MPC185.

Figure 14 shows the descriptor pointer field.




**Figure 14. Descriptor Pointer Field**

Table 14 shows the descriptor pointer field mapping.

**Table 14. Descriptor Pointer Field Mapping**

Bits	Name	Reset Value	Description
0:31	Data field pointer	0	<p>The data pointer field contains the address, in 60x address space, of the first byte of the data packet for either read or writeback. Transfers from the 60x bus with pointer address set to 0 is skipped.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>WARNING</b></p> <p>MPC185-initiated 60x bus writes can occur only on 64-bit word boundaries, but reads can occur on any byte boundary. Writing back a header read from a non-64-bit word boundary will yield unpredictable results.</p>

Following the length/pointer pairs is the next descriptor field, which contains the pointer to the next descriptor in memory. When processing of the current descriptor is completes, this value, if non-zero, is used to request an 60x burst read of the next-data-packet descriptor. This automatic load of the next descriptor is called *descriptor chaining*. Figure 15 displays the next descriptor pointer field.



**Figure 15. Next Descriptor Pointer Field**

Table 15 describes the descriptor pointer field mapping.

**Table 15. Descriptor Pointer Field Mapping**

Bits	Name	Reset Value	Description
0:31	Next descriptor pointer	0	<p>The next descriptor pointer field contains the address, in 60x address space, of the next descriptor to be fetched if descriptor chaining is enabled.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>WARNING</b></p> <p>The next descriptor pointer address must be modulo-8 aligned if writeback is enabled as the method of DONE notification.</p>

# 7 Descriptor Chaining

Descriptor chaining provides a measure of decoupling between host CPU activities and the status of the MPC185. Rather than waiting for the MPC185 to signal DONE and arbitrating for the 60x bus to write directly to the next-data-packet descriptor in the crypto-channel, the host can simply create new descriptors in memory and chain them to descriptors that the MPC185 has not fetched by filling the next-data-packet field with the address of the newly created descriptor. Whether or not processing continues automatically following next-descriptor fetch and whether or not an interrupt is generated depends on the programming of the crypto-channel’s configuration register.

See Section 6.1.1, “Crypto-Channel Configuration Register (CCCR),” for additional information about programming the MPC185 to signal and act upon descriptor completion.

**NOTE**

It is possible to insert a descriptor into an existing chain. However, take great care when doing so.

Figure 16 shows a conceptual chain, or linked list, of descriptors.




Figure 16. Chain of Descriptors

## 7.1 Null Fields

Sometimes a descriptor field may not be applicable to the requested service. With seven length/pointer pairs, not all descriptor fields are required to load the required keys, context, and data. (Some operations

do not require context; others may need to fetch a small, contiguous block of data only.) When processing data packet descriptors, the MPC185 skips any pointer entirely that has an associated length of 0.

## 8 Descriptor Classes

The MPC185 has two general classes of descriptors:

- static—a relatively unchanging usage of MPC185 resources
- dynamic—a continually changing usage model

### 8.1 Static Descriptors

Recall that the MPC185 has eleven execution units and four crypto-channels. EUs can be statically assigned, dedicating them to a particular crypto-channel. Certain combinations of EUs can be statically assigned to the same crypto-channel to facilitate multi-operation security processes such as IPsec ESP mode. When the system traffic model permits its use, static assignment can offer significant performance improvements over dynamic assignment by avoiding key and context switching per packet.

Static descriptors split the operations to be performed during a security operation into separate descriptors. The first descriptor is typically used only to set the EU mode and load the key and context. The second (and multiple subsequent) descriptor contains length/pointer pairs to the data to be permuted. Because the key and context are unchanging over multiple packets (or descriptors), the series of short reads and writes required to setup and tear down a session are avoided. This savings and the dedicated execution units crypto-channel can give a noticeable performance improvement.

Note that no mechanism exists to reset an EU automatically when statically assigned or when assignment changes from static to dynamic. Freescale recommends that the drivers always reset an EU just before removing a static assignment to it to prevent the previously used context from polluting another encryption stream.

For example, statically assigning a DEU to a particular crypto-channel permits the DEU to retain context between data packets. The following descriptors listed in [Table 16](#) through [Table 18](#) support context retention. [Table 16](#) defines the first DPD\_3DES\_CBC\_Encrypt descriptor in the static chain.

**Table 16. Actual Descriptor DPD\_Type 0001\_3DES\_CBC\_Encrypt**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Header	0x2070_0010	DPD_Type 0001_3DES_CBC_Encrypt
LEN_1	Length	Null
PTR_1	Pointer	Null
LEN_2	Length	Number of bytes of IV to be written to DEU IV register (always 8)
PTR_2	Pointer	60x address of IV
LEN_3	Length	Number of bytes of key to be written to DEU key register (must be 16 or 24)
PTR_3	Pointer	60x address of key
LEN_4	Length	Number of bytes to be ciphered

**Table 16. Actual Descriptor DPD\_Type 0001\_3DES\_CBC\_Encrypt (continued)**

Field	Value/Type	Description
PTR_4	Pointer	60x address of data to be ciphered
LEN_5	Length	Bytes to be written (should be equal to length of data-in)
PTR_5	Pointer	60x address where ciphered data is to be written
LEN_6	Nul	Null
PTR_6	Nul	Null
LEN_7	Nul	Null
PTR_7	Nul	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

Table 17 defines the second (or *N* middle) DPD\_3DES\_CBC\_Encrypt descriptor in the static chain. Note that the IV and key are not loaded; they remain in the DEU key and IV register.

**Table 17. Actual Descriptor DPD\_Type 0001\_3DES\_CBC\_Encrypt**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Header	0x2070_0010	DPD_Type 0001_3DES_CBC_Encrypt
LEN_1	Length	Null
PTR_1	Pointer	Null
LEN_2	Length	Null
PTR_2	Pointer	Null
LEN_3	Length	Null
PTR_3	Pointer	Null
LEN_4	Length	Number of bytes to be ciphered
PTR_4	Pointer	60x address of data to be ciphered
LEN_5	Length	Bytes to be written (should be equal to length of data-in)
PTR_5	Pointer	60x address where ciphered data is to be written
LEN_6	Nul	Null
PTR_6	Nul	Null
LEN_7	Nul	Null
PTR_7	Nul	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

Table 18 defines the final DPD\_3DES\_CBC\_Encrypt descriptor in the static chain. Note that the IV and key are not loaded; they remain in the DEU key and IV register. The IV may be optionally unloaded at the conclusion of the descriptor. When this descriptor completes, reset the EU. The EU should be released by means of a write to the EU assignment control register in the controller.

**Table 18. Actual Descriptor DPD\_Type 0001\_3DES\_CBC\_Encrypt**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Header	0x2070_0010	DPD_Type 0001_3DES_CBC_Encrypt
LEN_1	Length	Null
PTR_1	Pointer	Null
LEN_2	Length	Null
PTR_2	Pointer	Null
LEN_3	Length	Null
PTR_3	Pointer	Null
LEN_4	Length	Number of bytes to be ciphered
PTR_4	Pointer	60x address of data to be ciphered
LEN_5	Length	Bytes to be written (should be equal to length of data-in)
PTR_5	Pointer	60x address where ciphered data is to be written
LEN_6	Length	(Optional) Number of bytes of IV to be written to 60x memory space (always 8)
PTR_6	Pointer	(Optional) 60x address where IV is to be written
LEN_7	Nul	Null
PTR_7	Nul	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

## 8.2 Dynamic Descriptors

In a typical networking environment, packets from innumerable sessions arrive quite randomly. The host must determine which security association applies to the current packet and encrypt or decrypt without any knowledge of the security association of the previous or next packet. This situation calls for using dynamic descriptors.

When under dynamic assignment, an EU must be used under the assumption that a different crypto-channel (with a different context) may have just used the EU and that another crypto-channel (with yet another context) may use that EU immediately after the current crypto-channel has released the EU.

The descriptor shown in [Table 19](#) completely sets up the DEU for an encryption operation; loads the keys, context, and data; writes the permuted data back to memory; and (optionally) writes the altered context (IV) back to memory. (This step may be necessary when DES is operating in CBC mode.) When the descriptor completes, the DEU is automatically cleared and released.

**Table 19. Representative Descriptor DPD\_Type 0001\_3DES\_CBC\_Encrypt**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Header	0x2070_0010	DPD_Type 0001_3DES_CBC_Encrypt
LEN_1	Length	Null



**Table 19. Representative Descriptor DPD\_Type 0001\_3DES\_CBC\_Encrypt (continued)**

Field	Value/Type	Description
PTR_1	Pointer	Null
LEN_2	Length	Number of bytes of IV to be written to DEU IV register (always 8)
PTR_2	Pointer	60x address of IV
LEN_3	Length	Number of bytes of key to be written to DEU key register (must be 16 or 24)
PTR_3	Pointer	60x address of key
LEN_4	Length	Number of bytes to be ciphered
PTR_4	Pointer	60x address of data to be ciphered
LEN_5	Length	Bytes to be written (should be equal to length of data-in)
PTR_5	Pointer	60x address where ciphered data is to be written
LEN_6	Length	(Optional) Number of bytes of IV to be written to 60x memory space (always 8)
PTR_6	Pointer	(Optional) 60x185 address where IV is to be written
LEN_7	Nul	Null
PTR_7	Nul	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

Note that the descriptor header value is the same value used in the static assignment example. The descriptor header does not determine static versus dynamic assignment (a difference from the MPC190). In the MPC185, the EU Assignment Control Register in the Controller entirely controls static assignment (see Chapter 8 in the *MPC185 Security Co-Processor User's Manual* for more information about the EUACR). When an EU is statically assigned to a channel, it uses keys and context from the current descriptor for the following descriptor until the EU is reset and released from static assignment. Freescale does not recommend releasing an EU and subsequently resetting it, because any channel with an outstanding request for an EU of the type being released could be dynamically assigned the EU before the reset cleared the previous key and context. When an EU is dynamically assigned to a channel, the channel automatically resets the EU before releasing it for another channel's use.

## 9 Additional Examples

The following sections contain descriptor examples of some common cryptographic transforms. Also provided are tables of derivative descriptor headers for closely related transforms.

## 9.1 Dynamically Assigned 3DES-HMAC-SHA-1 Decrypt (Inbound IPsec ESP)

Table 20 shows a dynamic descriptor example of an inbound IPsec ESP transform.

**Table 20. Representative Descriptor DPD\_Type 0010\_3DES\_CBC\_HMAC\_SHA-1\_Decrypt**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Header	0x2063_1C22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1_Decrypt
LEN_1	Length	Number of bytes of HMAC key to be written to MDEU key register
PTR_1	Pointer	60x address of HMAC key
LEN_2	Length	Number of bytes to be HMAC'd
PTR_2	Pointer	60x address of data to be HMAC'd
LEN_3	Length	Number of bytes of key to be written to DEU key register (must be 16 or 24)
PTR_3	Pointer	60x address of key
LEN_4	Length	Number of bytes of IV to be written to DEU IV register (always 8)
PTR_4	Pointer	60x address of IV
LEN_5	Length	Number of bytes of ciphertext to be decrypted
PTR_5	Pointer	60x address of ciphertext to be decrypted
LEN_6	Length	Number of bytes of plaintext to be written out to memory (should be equal to length of data-in)
PTR_6	Pointer	60x address where plaintext is to be written
LEN_7	Length	Number of bytes of HMAC to be written to 60x memory space (always 20 for HMAC-SHA-1)
PTR_7	Pointer	60x address where HMAC is to be written
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

The descriptor header encodes the information that is required to select the DEU for Op\_0 and the MDEU for Op\_1. The Op\_0 mode data configured the DEU to operate in 3DES, CBC, decrypt mode. The Op\_1 mode data configured the MDEU to operate in HMAC-SHA-1 mode. Because all the data necessary to calculate the HMAC in a single dynamic descriptor is available, initialize and autopad are set, and continue is off.

The descriptor header also encodes the descriptor type 0010, which defines the input and output ordering for 'hmac\_snoop\_no\_afeu.' The HMAC key is loaded first, followed by the length and pointer to the data over which the HMAC will be calculated. The 3DES key is loaded next, followed by the 3DES IV. The number of bytes to be ciphered and starting address will be an offset of the number of bytes being HMAC'd. The data to be decrypted and HMAC'd is brought into the MPC185 only a single time, with the DEU and MDEU reading only the portion that matches the starting address and byte length in the length/pointer fields that correspond to their data of interest.

Ciphertext is brought into the DEU input FIFO, with the MDEU in-snooping the portion of the data it has been told to process. As the decryption continues, the plaintext fills the DEU output FIFO, and this data is written back to system memory as needed. When the final byte of data to be HMAC'd has been processed through the MDEU, the descriptor causes the MDEU to write the HMAC to the indicated area in 60x memory. The MPC185 writes the entire 20 bytes HMAC-SHA-1 to 60x memory, and the host compares the most significant 12 bytes of the HMAC generated by the MPC185 with the HMAC that was received with the inbound packet. If the HMACs match, the packet integrity check passes.

The next descriptor pointer is optional, and if a next descriptor is indicated, that descriptor may be completely unrelated to the operation performed by the descriptor shown in [Table 20](#).

## 9.2 Dynamically Assigned 3DES-HMAC-SHA-1 Encrypt (Outbound IPsec ESP)

[Table 21](#) shows a dynamic descriptor example of an outbound IPsec ESP transform.

**Table 21. Representative Descriptor DPD\_Type 0010\_3DES\_CBC\_HMAC\_SHA-1\_Decrypt**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Header	0x2073_1C20	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt
LEN_1	Length	Number of bytes of HMAC key to be written to MDEU key register
PTR_1	Pointer	60x address of HMAC key
LEN_2	Length	Number of bytes to be HMAC'd
PTR_2	Pointer	60x address of data to be HMAC'd
LEN_3	Length	Number of bytes of key to be written to DEU key register (must be 16 or 24)
PTR_3	Pointer	60x address of key
LEN_4	Length	Number of bytes of IV to be written to DEU IV register (always 8)
PTR_4	Pointer	60x address of IV
LEN_5	Length	Number of bytes of plaintext to be encrypted
PTR_5	Pointer	60x address of plaintext to be encrypted
LEN_6	Length	Number of bytes of ciphertext to be written out to memory (should be equal to length of data-in)
PTR_6	Pointer	60x address where ciphertext is to be written
LEN_7	Length	Number of bytes of HMAC to be written to 60x memory space (always 20)
PTR_7	Pointer	60x address where HMAC is to be written
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

The descriptor header encodes the information that is required to select the DEU for Op\_0 and the MDEU for Op\_1. The Op\_0 mode data configured the DEU to operate in 3DES, CBC, encrypt mode. The Op\_1 mode data configured the MDEU to operate in HMAC-SHA-1 mode. Because all the data necessary to calculate the HMAC in a single dynamic descriptor is available, initialize, and autopad are set, while continue is off.

The descriptor header also encodes the descriptor type 0010, which defines the input and output ordering for 'hmac\_snoop\_no\_afeu.' The HMAC key is loaded first, followed by the length and pointer to the data over which the HMAC will be calculated. The 3DES key is loaded next, followed by the 3DES IV. The number of bytes to be encrypted and starting address will be an offset of the number of bytes being HMAC'd. The data to be encrypted and HMAC'd is brought into the MPC185 only a single time, with the DEU and MDEU reading only the portion that matches the starting address and byte length in the length/pointer fields that correspond to their data of interest.

Plaintext is brought into the DEU input FIFO, with the MDEU out-snooping the portion of the data it was told to process. As the encryption continues, the ciphertext fills the DEU output FIFO, and this data is written back to system memory as needed. When the final byte of data to be HMAC'd is processed through the MDEU, the descriptor causes the MDEU to write the HMAC to the indicated area in 60x memory. The MPC185 writes the entire 20 bytes HMAC-SHA-1 to 60x memory, and the host appends the most significant 12 bytes of the HMAC generated by the MPC185 to the packet as the authentication trailer. Common practice in IPsec ESP with 3DES-CBC is to use the last 8 bytes of the ciphertext as the IV for the next packet. In that case, the host should copy the last 8 bytes of the ciphertext to the Security Association database entry for this particular session before transmitting the packet.

The next descriptor pointer is optional, and if a next descriptor is indicated, that descriptor may be completely unrelated to the operation performed on the descriptor shown in [Table 21](#).

### 9.3 Dynamically Assigned HMAC-MD-5 (Inbound/Outbound IPsec AH)

[Table 22](#) shows a dynamic descriptor example of an inbound/outbound IPsec AH transform.

**Table 22. Representative Descriptor DPD\_Type 0001\_HMAC-MD-5**

Field	Value / Type	Description
Header	0x31E0_0010	DPD_Type 0001_HMAC_MD-5
LEN_1	Length	Null
PTR_1	Pointer	Null
LEN_2	Length	Null
PTR_2	Pointer	Null
LEN_3	Length	Number of bytes of HMAC key to be written to MDEU key register
PTR_3	Pointer	60x address of HMAC key
LEN_4	Length	Number of bytes of data to be written to MDEU input FIFO
PTR_4	Pointer	60x address of data
LEN_5	Length	Null
PTR_5	Pointer	Null
LEN_6	Length	Number of bytes of HMAC to be written out to memory (always 16 MD-5)
PTR_6	Pointer	60x address where HMAC is to be written
LEN_7	Length	Null

**Table 22. Representative Descriptor DPD\_Type 0001\_HMAC-MD-5 (continued)**

Field	Value / Type	Description
PTR_7	Pointer	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

The descriptor header encodes the information that is required to select the MDEU for Op\_0 and no EU for Op\_1. The Op\_0 mode data configured the MDEU to operate in HMAC-MD-5 mode. Because all the data necessary to calculate the HMAC in a single dynamic descriptor is available, initialize and autopad are set and continue is off.

The descriptor header also encodes the descriptor type 0001, which defines the input and output ordering for ‘common\_nonsnoop\_no\_afeu.’ This descriptor type is used for most operations that do not require a secondary EU. Following some null pointers, the HMAC key is loaded, followed by the length and pointer to the data over which the HMAC will be calculated.

The data is brought into the MDEU input FIFO, and when the final byte of data to be HMAC’d has been processed through the MDEU, the descriptor causes the MDEU to write the HMAC to the indicated area in 60x memory. The MPC185 writes the entire 16 bytes HMAC-MD-5 to 60x memory, and depending on whether the packet is inbound or outbound, the host either inserts the most significant 12 bytes of the HMAC generated by the MPC185 into the packet header (outbound) or compares the HMAC generated by the MPC185 with the HMAC that was received with the inbound packet (obviously inbound). If the HMACs match, the packet integrity check passes.

The next descriptor pointer is optional, and if a next descriptor is indicated, that descriptor may be completely unrelated to the operation performed by the descriptor shown in [Table 22](#).

[Table 23](#) shows current, most commonly used IPsec descriptor headers. In all the descriptor headers shown, the MDEU performs auto padding.

**Table 23. Common IPsec Dynamic Descriptor Headers**

Value/Type	Description
0x2003_1E22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt
0x2013_1E20	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt
0x2003_1C22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt
0x2013_1C20	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt
0x2043_1E22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt
0x2053_1E20	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt
0x2043_1C22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt
0x2053_1C20	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt
0x2023_1E22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt
0x2033_1E20	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt
0x2023_1C22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt

**Table 23. Common IPSec Dynamic Descriptor Headers (continued)**

Value/Type	Description
0x2033_1C20	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt
0x2063_1E22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt
0x2073_1E20	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt
0x2063_1C22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt
0x2073_1C20	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt
0x31C0_0010	DPD_Type 0001_HMAC_SHA-1
0x31D0_0010	DPD_Type 0001_HMAC_SHA-256
0x31E0_0010	DPD_Type 0001_HMAC_MD-5

Table 24 shows current AES descriptors as they will be used for IPSec and SRTP. In all the descriptor headers shown, the MDEU performs auto padding.

**Table 24. Additional Multi-Op Dynamic Descriptor Headers**

Value / Type	Description
0x6083_1E22	DPD_Type 0010_AES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt
0x6093_1E20	DPD_Type 0010_AES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt
0x6083_1C22	DPD_Type 0010_AES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt
0x6093_1C20	DPD_Type 0010_AES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt
0x6083_1D22	DPD_Type 0010_AES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-256 Decrypt
0x6093_1D20	DPD_Type 0010_AES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-256 Encrypt
0x60A3_1E22	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt
0x60B3_1E20	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt
0x60A3_1C22	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt
0x60B3_1C20	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt
0x60A3_1D22	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-256 Decrypt
0x60B3_1D20	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-256 Encrypt
0x60E3_1E22	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CTR_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt
0x60E3_1E20	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CTR_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt
0x60E3_1C22	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt
0x60E3_1C20	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt
0x60E3_1D22	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA-256 Decrypt
0x60E3_1D20	DPD_Type 0010_AES_CTR_HMAC_SHA-256 Encrypt

## 9.4 Statically Assigned 3DES-HMAC-SHA-1 Decrypt (Inbound IPsec ESP)

This example, shown in [Table 25](#), is designed to contrast the dynamic descriptor shown in [Table 20](#). For whatever reason, the data to be decrypted and authenticated is not available in a single contiguous block, or the total data size is larger than 32 Kbytes. The user must statically assign a DEU and MDEU to a channel before launching this descriptor chain.

The first descriptor loads the appropriate keys and context while the N middle descriptors continue processing data. The final descriptor decrypts the final data and allows the HMAC calculation to complete.

**Table 25. Representative First Descriptor DPD\_Type 0010\_3DES\_CBC\_HMAC\_SHA-1\_Decrypt**

Field	Value / Type	Description
Header	0x2063_9822	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1_Decrypt
LEN_1	Length	Number of bytes of HMAC key to be written to MDEU key register
PTR_1	Pointer	60x address of HMAC key
LEN_2	Length	Number of bytes to be hashed
PTR_2	Pointer	60x address of data to be hashed
LEN_3	Length	Number of bytes of key to be written to DEU key register (must be 16 or 24)
PTR_3	Pointer	60x address of key
LEN_4	Length	Number of bytes of IV to be written to DEU IV register (always 8)
PTR_4	Pointer	60x address of IV
LEN_5	Length	Number of bytes to be ciphered
PTR_5	Pointer	60x address of data to be ciphered
LEN_6	Length	Bytes to be written (should be equal to length of data-in)
PTR_6	Pointer	60x address where ciphered data is to be written
LEN_7	Nul	Null
PTR_7	Nul	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

The first descriptor header encodes the information that is required to select the DEU for Op\_0 and the MDEU for Op\_1. The Op\_0 mode data configured the DEU to operate in 3DES, CBC, decrypt mode. The Op\_1 mode data configured the MDEU to operate in SHA-1 mode. Because all the data necessary to calculate the HMAC is not present, the first static descriptor is set to initialize, continue, and HMAC, and autopad is off.

The descriptor header also encodes the descriptor type 0010, which defines the input and output ordering for 'hmac\_snoop\_no\_afeu.' The HMAC key is loaded first, followed by the length and pointer to the data over which the initial hash will be calculated. The 3DES key is loaded next, followed by the 3DES IV. The number of bytes to be ciphered and starting address is an offset of the number of bytes being hashed. The data to be decrypted and hashed is brought into the MPC185 only a single time, with the DEU and MDEU

reading only the portion that matches the starting address and byte length in the length/pointer fields that correspond to their data of interest.

Ciphertext is brought into the DEU input FIFO, with the MDEU snooping the portion of the data it has been told to process. As the decryption continues, the plaintext fills the DEU output FIFO, and this data is written back to system memory as needed. Because it has been told to expect more data (HMAC off, continue on), the descriptor must not attempt to output the contents of the MDEU message digest register.

The next descriptor pointer should point to the descriptor shown in [Table 26](#).

**Table 26. Representative Middle Descriptor DPD\_Type 0010\_3DES\_CBC\_HMAC\_SHA-1 Decrypt**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Header	0x2063_8022	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 decrypt
LEN_1	Nul	Null
PTR_1	Nul	Null
LEN_2	Length	Number of bytes to be Hashed
PTR_2	Pointer	60x address of data to be hashed
LEN_3	Nul	Null
PTR_3	Nul	Null
LEN_4	Nul	Null
PTR_4	Nul	Null
LEN_5	Length	Number of bytes to be ciphered
PTR_5	Pointer	60x address of data to be ciphered
LEN_6	Length	Bytes to be written (should be equal to Length of data-in)
PTR_6	Pointer	60x address where ciphered data is to be written
LEN_7	Nul	Null
PTR_7	Nul	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

The middle descriptor header encodes the information required to select the DEU for Op\_0 and the MDEU for Op\_1. The Op\_0 mode data configured the DEU to operate in 3DES, CBC, decrypt mode. The Op\_1 mode data configured the MDEU to operate in SHA-1 mode. Because all the data necessary to calculate the HMAC is still not present, the middle static descriptor is set to continue, while initialize, HMAC, and autopad are off.

The descriptor header also encodes the descriptor type 0010, which defines the input and output ordering for 'hmac\_snoop\_no\_afeu.' The HMAC key is already loaded, and does not need to be reloaded. The length and pointer to the data over which the initial hash will be calculated must be provided for this descriptor. The 3DES key and IV are already loaded, and need not be reloaded.

Ciphertext is brought into the DEU input FIFO, with the MDEU snooping the portion of the data it has been told to process. As the decryption continues, the plaintext fills the DEU output FIFO, and this data is



written back to system memory as needed. Because it has been told to expect more data (HMAC off, continue on), the descriptor must not attempt to output the contents of the MDEU message digest register. The next descriptor pointer should point to the descriptor shown in [Table 27](#).

**Table 27. Representative Final Descriptor DPD\_Type 0010\_3DES\_CBC\_HMAC\_SHA-1 Decrypt**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Header	0x2063_8C22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 decrypt
LEN_1	Nul	Null
PTR_1	Nul	Null
LEN_2	Length	Number of bytes to be hashed
PTR_2	Pointer	60x address of data to be hashed
LEN_3	Nul	Null
PTR_3	Nul	Null
LEN_4	Nul	Null
PTR_4	Nul	Null
LEN_5	Length	Number of bytes to be ciphered
PTR_5	Pointer	60x address of data to be ciphered
LEN_6	Length	Bytes to be written (should be equal to length of data-in)
PTR_6	Pointer	60x address where ciphered data is to be written
LEN_7	Nul	Null
PTR_7	Nul	Null
PTR_NEXT	Nul	Null

The final descriptor header encodes the information that is required to select the DEU for Op\_0 and the MDEU for Op\_1. The Op\_0 mode data configured the DEU to operate in 3DES, CBC, decrypt mode. The Op\_1 mode data configured the MDEU to operate in SHA-1 mode. Because the final data necessary to calculate the HMAC is now present, the final static descriptor is set to HMAC and autopad, and continue and initialize are off.

The descriptor header also encodes the descriptor type 0010, which defines the input and output ordering for 'hmac\_snoop\_no\_afeu.' The HMAC key is already loaded, and does not need to be reloaded. The length and pointer to the data over which the initial hash will be calculated must be provided for this descriptor. The 3DES key and IV are already loaded, and need not be reloaded.

Ciphertext is brought into the DEU input FIFO, with the MDEU snooping the portion of the data it has been told to process. As the decryption continues, the plaintext fills the DEU output FIFO, and this data is written back to system memory as needed. Because it has been told it has the final data for HMAC calculation (HMAC on, continue off), the descriptor must output the contents of the MDEU message digest register to the indicated address in system memory. The MPC185 writes the entire 20-byte HMAC-SHA-1

to 60x memory, and depending on the security protocol in question, the host compares the most significant  $x$  bytes of the HMAC generated by the MPC185 with the HMAC sent with the packet.

The next descriptor pointer should be null, as the channel should not fetch another descriptor until the EUs are reset. The static assignment of the current EUs need not end, if the channel is expected to need the same EUs to operate on a similar static chain that belongs to a difference secure session.

Table 28 shows current, most commonly used IPSec descriptor headers. In all the descriptor headers shown, the MDEU performs auto padding for the final data block, as needed.

**Table 28. Common IPSec Static Descriptor Headers**

Value/Type	Description
0x2003_9A22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt First
0x2003_8222	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt Middle
0x2003_8E22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt Last
0x2013_9A22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt First
0x2013_8220	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt Middle
0x2013_8E20	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt Last
0x2003_9822	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt First
0x2003_8022	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt Middle
0x2003_8C22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt Last
0x2013_9820	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt First
0x2013_8020	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt Middle
0x2013_8C20	DPD_Type 0010_DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt Last
0x2043_9A22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt First
0x2043_8222	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt Middle
0x2043_8E22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt Last
0x2053_9A22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt First
0x2053_8220	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt Middle
0x2053_8E20	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt Last
0x2043_9822	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt First
0x2043_8022	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt Middle
0x2043_8C22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt Last
0x2053_9820	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt First
0x2053_8020	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt Middle
0x2053_8C20	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_ECB_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt Last
0x2023_9A22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt First
0x2023_8222	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt Middle

**Table 28. Common IPSec Static Descriptor Headers (continued)**

Value/Type	Description
0x2023_8E22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt Last
0x2033_9A22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt First
0x2033_8220	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt Middle
0x2033_8E20	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt Last
0x2023_9822	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt First
0x2023_8022	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt Middle
0x2023_8C22	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt Last
0x2033_9820	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt First
0x2033_8020	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt Middle
0x2033_8C20	DPD_Type 0010_DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt Last
0x2063_9A22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt First
0x2063_8222	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt Middle
0x2063_8E22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Decrypt Last
0x2073_9A22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt First
0x2073_8220	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt Middle
0x2073_8E20	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_MD-5 Encrypt Last
0x2063_9822	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt First
0x2063_8022	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt Middle
0x2063_8C22	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Decrypt Last
0x2073_9820	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt First
0x2073_8020	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt Middle
0x2073_8C20	DPD_Type 0010_3DES_CBC_HMAC_SHA-1 Encrypt Last

## 10 SSLv3.1/TLS1.0 Processing

The MPC185 is capable of assisting in SSL record layer processing, however, for SSL v3.0 and earlier, this support is limited to acceleration of the encryption only. The MDEU does not calculate the version of HMAC required by early versions of SSL. SSLv3.1 and TLSv1.0 use the same HMAC version as IPSec (specified in RFC2104), which the MPC185 MDEU supports, allowing it to off-load both bulk encryption and authentication from the host processor.

The order of operations mandated in the protocol makes SSLv3.1 and TLSv1.0 (henceforth called *TLS*) record layer encryption/decryption more complicated for hardware than IPSec. TLS performs the HMAC function first, then attaches the HMAC (which is variable size) to the end of the payload data. The payload data, HMAC, and any padding added after the HMAC are then encrypted. Parallel encryption and

authentication of TLS records cannot be performed using the MPC185 snooping mechanisms that work for IPsec.

Performing TLS record layer encryption and authentication with the MPC185 requires two descriptors. For outbound records, one descriptor calculates the HMAC, and a second encrypts the record, HMAC, and padding. For inbound records, the first descriptor decrypts the record, while the second descriptor recalculates the HMAC for validation by the host. With some planning, the programmer can create the outbound descriptors and launch them as a chain, leaving the MPC194 to complete the full HMAC/encrypt operation before signaling DONE. Placing the output from descriptor 1 into the MPC185 on-chip gpRAM, then fetching that data as input for descriptor 2 can provide additional bus bandwidth savings and improved system performance. For inbound records, the MPC185 signals DONE after decryption so that the host can determine the location of the HMAC before setting up the HMAC validation descriptor.

The following sections provide examples and explanations covering TLS outbound and inbound processing using dynamic assignment.

## 10.1 Outbound TLS Descriptor 1

The first descriptor performs the HMAC of the record header and the record payload, as shown in [Table 29](#). In this example, the HMAC is generated using the MD-5 algorithm.

**Table 29. Outbound TLS Descriptor 1**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Header	0x31E0_0010	DPD_Type 0001_HMAC_MD-5
LEN_1	Length	Null
PTR_1	Pointer	Null
LEN_2	Length	Null
PTR_2	Pointer	Null
LEN_3	Length	Number of bytes of HMAC key to be written to MDEU key register
PTR_3	Pointer	60x address of HMAC key
LEN_4	Length	Number of bytes of data to be written to MDEU input FIFO
PTR_4	Pointer	60x address of data
LEN_5	Length	Null
PTR_5	Pointer	Null
LEN_6	Length	Number of bytes of HMAC to be written out to memory (always 16 MD-5)
PTR_6	Pointer	60x address where HMAC is to be written
LEN_7	Length	Null
PTR_7	Pointer	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Pointer to next descriptor

The primary EU is the MDEU, with its mode bits set to cause the MDEU to initialize its context registers, perform autopadding if the data size is not evenly divisible by 512 bits, and calculate an HMAC-MD-5. The descriptor header does not designate a secondary EU, so the setting of the snoop-type bit is ignored. At the conclusion of outbound TLS descriptor 1, the crypto-channel has calculated the HMAC, placed it in memory, and reset and released the MDEU.

## 10.2 Outbound TLS Descriptor 2

The second descriptor performs the encryption of the record, HMAC, pad length, and any padding generated to disguise the size of the TLS record, as shown in [Table 30](#).

**Table 30. Outbound TLS Descriptor 2**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Type 0101 common_nonsnoop_afeu	0x1000_0010	AFEU, new key, do not dump context, perform permute
LEN_1	Length	Null
PTR_1	Pointer	Null
LEN_2	Length	Null
PTR_2	Pointer	Null
LEN_3	Length	Length of ARC-4 key
PTR_3	Pointer	Pointer to ARC-4 Key
LEN_4	Length	Length of data to be read and permuted
PTR_4	Pointer	Pointer to data in memory
LEN_5	Length	Length of data to be written after permutation
PTR_5	Pointer	Pointer to memory buffer for write back
LEN_6	Length	Null
PTR_6	Pointer	Null
LEN_7	Length	Null
PTR_7	Pointer	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Null or pointer to unrelated next descriptor

Not surprisingly, inbound TLS processing reverses the order of operations of outbound processing.

## 10.3 Inbound TLS Descriptor 1

The first descriptor performs the decryption of the record, HMAC, pad length, and any padding generated to disguise the size of the TLS record, as shown in [Table 31](#).

**Table 31. Inbound TLS Descriptor 1**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Type 0101 common_nonsnoop_afeu	0x1000_0010	AFEU, new key, do not dump context, perform permute
LEN_1	Length	Place holder
PTR_1	Pointer	Place holder
LEN_2	Length	Place holder
PTR_2	Pointer	Place holder
LEN_3	Length	Length of ARC-4 key
PTR_3	Pointer	Pointer to ARC-4 Key
LEN_4	Length	Length of data to be read and permuted
PTR_4	Pointer	Pointer to data in memory
LEN_5	Length	Length of data to be written after permutation
PTR_5	Pointer	Pointer to memory buffer for writeback
LEN_6	Length	Null
PTR_6	Pointer	Null
LEN_7	Length	Null
PTR_7	Pointer	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Null or pointer to unrelated next descriptor

Note that ARC-4 does not have a concept of encrypt versus decrypt. As a stream cipher, ARC-4 generates a key stream that is XOR'd with the input data. If the input data is plaintext, the output is ciphertext. If the input data is ciphertext (which was previously XOR'd with the same key), the result is plaintext.

The primary EU is the AFEU, with its mode bits set to cause the AFEU to load the key and initialize the AFEU S-box for data permutation.

The descriptor header does not designate a secondary EU, so the setting of the snoop type bit is ignored.

At the conclusion of inbound TLS descriptor 1, the AFEU has decrypted the TLS record so that the payload and HMAC are readable. The negotiation of the TLS session should provide the receiver with enough information about the session parameters (hash algorithm for HMAC, whether padding is in use) to create inbound descriptors 2 along with descriptor 1. If so, the next descriptor pointer field should point to descriptor 2.

Alternatively, the MPC185 could signal DONE at the conclusion of inbound descriptor 1 to allow the host to inspect the decrypted record and generate the descriptor that is necessary to validate the HMAC. In that case, inbound descriptor 2 does not need to be linked to inbound descriptor 1, and could even be processed by a different crypto-channel.

## 10.4 Inbound TLS Descriptor 2

The second descriptor performs the HMAC of the record header and the record payload. In the example shown in [Table 32](#), the HMAC is generated using the MD-5 algorithm.

**Table 32. Inbound TLS Descriptor 2**

Field	Value/Type	Description
Type 0001 common_nonsnoop_non_afeu	0x31E0_0010	MDEU, HMAC, MD-5, autopad
LEN_1	Length	Null
PTR_1	Pointer	Null
LEN_2	Length	Null
PTR_2	Pointer	Null
LEN_3	Length	Length of MD-5 key
PTR_3	Pointer	Pointer to MD-5 key
LEN_4	Length	Length of data to be read and permuted
PTR_4	Pointer	Pointer to data in memory
LEN_5	Length	Null
PTR_5	Pointer	Null
LEN_6	Length	Length of HMAC to be written to memory (16 bytes for MD-5)
PTR_6	Pointer	Pointer to memory location for HMAC write (must be modulo-8)
LEN_7	Length	Null
PTR_7	Pointer	Null
PTR_NEXT	Pointer	Null or pointer to unrelated next descriptor

The primary EU is the MDEU, with its mode bits set to cause the MDEU to initialize its context registers, perform autopadding if the data size is not evenly divisible by 512 bits, and calculate an HMAC-MD-5.

The descriptor header does not designate a secondary EU, so the setting of the snoop type bit is ignored.

At the conclusion of inbound TLS Descriptor 2, the crypto-channel has calculated the HMAC, placed it in memory, and has reset and released the MDEU. The host can compare the HMAC generated by inbound TLS descriptor 2 with the HMAC that came as part of the record. If the HMACs match, the record is known to have arrived unmodified, and can be passed to the application layer.

The next descriptor pointer field can also be null, or point to an unrelated dynamic descriptor.

## 11 Conclusion

The MPC185 device driver generates most of the descriptors described in this application note; however, the drivers are structured for general purposes, and may provide more options than certain applications require. Using more details and specific examples of descriptor programming, the programmer can

## Revision History

implement an application-specific minimal driver with higher performance and a smaller memory footprint.

# 12 Revision History

Table 33 provides a revision history for this application note.

**Table 33. Document Revision History**

Rev. Number	Date	Substantive Change(s)
1	10/29/2006	Document template update.
0	08/22/2003	Initial release.



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